Disintermediation of Inter-Blockchain Transactions by English, S. Matthew et al.
Disintermediation of Inter-Blockchain Transactions
S. Matthew English, Fabrizio Orlandi, So¨ren Auer
Fraunhofer Institut fu¨r Intelligente Analyse und Informationssysteme (IAIS)
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t Bonn
{english, orlandi, auer}@cs.uni-bonn.de
Abstract
Different versions of peer-to-peer electronic cash exist as data represented by separate
blockchains. Payments between such systems cannot be sent directly from one party to
another without going through a financial institution. Bitcoin provided part of the
solution but its utility is limited to intra-blockchain transactions. The benefits are lost
if a trusted third party is required to execute inter -blockchain transactions. We propose
a solution to the inter-blockchain transaction problem using the same fundamental
principles of Bitcoin. The protocol is described by the U¨berledger framework, a
hierarchical meta-blockchain layer that encapsulates information regarding the fidelity
of peer-to-peer transaction facilitators.
1 Introduction
In the world prior to the introduction of Bitcoin no peer-to-peer version of electronic
cash had managed to solve the problem of double-spending. Nakamoto in [6] described
the state of the art whereby a common solution had been to “introduce a trusted central
authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending... The problem
with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company
running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank”.
Bitcoin is an effective mechanism to circumvent dependence on a trusted central
authority however we have borne witness to the hydralike re-emergence of this
phenomenon in the form of exchanges between cryptocurrency systems. For instance to
transfer e100.00 of value between the cryptocurrency Bitcoin (BTC) and the
cryptocurrency Ethereum (ETH) it is generally necessary to employ the services of an
exchange such as Bitfinex1, or another third party service.
In this work we propose a framework to utilize the same fundamental principles that
Bitcoin used to disintermediate the exchange of value amongst participants on a
common blockchain system to the problem of disintermediation between blockchains
that are disjoint.
In the decentralized constellation of cryptocurrencies the focal points of centripetal
force are digital currency exchangers. Centralized processes are susceptible to
developing into single points of failure, a feature that resilient networks seek to
minimize. Digital currency exchangers provide primarily two services, they transfer
value in digital currencies for fiat money, or different digital currencies. We demonstrate
that the interchange of value between different digital currencies is a task that can be
1 www.bitfinex.com
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Figure 1. Network Topologies
Figure 2. Inter-Blockchain Value Transmission
performed with high fidelity in the absence of trusted third party exchangers through
the use of a hierarchical meta-blockchain layer.
2 The Exchange Model
On the 2nd of August 2016 a highly trafficked digital currency exchange reported a heist
of $72,000,000 USD [1]. This is merely one episode in a history of criminal negligence or
malfeasance going back to Mt. Gox (the infamous exchange responsible for the loss of
$460,000,000 in customer funds [5]) and beyond. Accordingly there is a strong interest
in viable alternatives to transferring information, viz. value, between disparate
blockchain systems independent from such central authorities.
Reliance on exchangers to move value between blockchain systems is a policy that
suffers from the “inherent weaknesses of the trust based model” [6]. Cryptocurrency
users who have interacted with an exchange will be familiar with the stringent regime of
know your customer (KYC) and will have had direct experience with exchanges “wary
of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise
need” [6]. As originally envisioned by Nakamoto in [6] our framework is engineered to
“allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going
through a financial institution”.
3 Related Work
It has been shown by Thomas & Schwartz in [3] that protocols whereby a subset of
network participants (with accounts on two distinct blockchains) is employed to act as
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Figure 3. Disintermediated Inter-Blockchain Transaction
“connectors and notaries”, i.e. facilitators of a transaction between ledgers, are feasible
so long as the subset is sufficiently large to ensure that Byzantine actors can be readily
identified (n ≥ 3f+1).
One design feature of the system described in [3] is an ephemeral aggregation of
transaction facilitators, such that “[facilitators] are organized in ad-hoc groups for each
payment”. This arrangement preserves the integrity of the funds involved in the
transaction, either they are correctly allocated or the transaction is forfeit. However
information regarding the integrity of each node is not preserved in a publicly available
repository of information, such as a blockchain, where it could be put to use in future
transactions.
In contrast to [3] we seek to indelibly preserve all information regarding the
successful (or unsuccessful) outcome of the transaction and the behaviour of constituent
parties. The procedure sketched in Figure 3.
4 Framework Architecture
We introduce the U¨berledger framework2. It is a hierarchical blockchain model based on
the following proposition:
Conjecture 4.1. (U¨berledger) In the transference of value between two disjoint
consensus networks the property of timestampedness cannot be preserved in the absence
of an additional meta consensus network.
Careful examination of Nakamoto’s protocol in [6] will yield timestampedness as the
crux of the cryptocurrency system. We take timestampedness to mean that each
transaction (Ti ) is part of a linearly ordered list of actions (Aix ). In our model
consensus network is equivalent to blockchain, as defined by Kiayias et al. in [2].
2 www.uberledger.io
3/5
Figure 4. Transaction Data Model
5 Design Considerations
5.1 Incentive Structure
The incentive structure that motivates the continued maintenance of a resilient
blockchain is critical, as the undertaking is costly. Honest participants of the U¨berledger
framework stand to be remunerated in proportion to their ability to attract transaction
fees for their services.
5.2 Data Representation
Transactions are naturally represented in the form of a 3-tuple (P1, a, P2), where P is a
transacting party and a is the article of trade. Accordingly we employ the RDF data
model and encapsulate salient transaction information in the form of a graph, as
demonstrated in Figure 4. To define data in the form of a graph it is necessary to
employ a schema. For this purpose we have adapted the blockchain ontology with
dynamic extensibility (BLONDiE)3.
This model ensures that a wide range of disparate data resources, e.g. multiple
accounts across different blockchains, unique username, reputation information, and
cryptographic keys, are rendered in a standardized and universally accessible format
adhering to the W3C principles of linked open data.
5.3 Participant Evaluation
Insofar as the integrity of nodes in the framework exists as a matter of public record we
adapt the design considerations in [4] to serve as fundamental benchmarks of our
peer-to-peer reputation system, as such the protocol is:
1. Self-policing.
2. Anonymity maintaining.
3. Negatively biased to newcomers.
4. Minimal in overhead (i.e. computation, infrastructure, storage, and message
complexity).
5. Robust to malicious coordinated collectives.
3www.github.com/EIS-Bonn/BLONDiE
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Discussion
The balkanization of the cryptocurrency ecosystem is a phenomenon that is enforced by
the business model of the exchanges that seek to exploit their control over channels into
and out of different blockchains inhibiting those interested in experimentation on new
platforms. Such a climate stifles the ability to assess innovative features and challenge
one’s understanding of novel techniques. Our framework is engineered to redress such
toll roads on the highway of creative endeavour. U¨berledger is an open source initiative
that seeks to engender an environment of free creative development.
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